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between the two corporations. 92 In McKee, where the lands, build-
ings, machinery, and tradenames were all transferred to the succes-
sor who continued to manufacture the same type of product, the
court found no liability since there was no evidence of continuity of
management or ownership. 93
Competent business decisions are made daily in matters involv-
ing the acquisition of commercial interests. Where unknown or
contingent liabilities may exist it is essential to a sound commercial
decision that the law pertinent to the assumption of a predecessor
corporation's liabilities be clear and predictable. The Offen decision,
by utilizing a "sufficient similiar factors" approach in determining
continuity, provides little guidance as to what course of conduct
should be undertaken by a potential transferee. The standard of
conduct required for protection might be the inspection and perfec-
tion of past products of the predecessor; 94
 the inability to offer
positions to the employees of the predecessor; and the inability to
use the tradename so as not to be in any way related to the goodwill
of the predecessor. If followed, this deviation from the predictability
of past corporate liability doctrine will have an inhibitory impact on
the commercial transfers of assets.
MICHAEL A. DEANGELIS
Employment Discrimination—Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967—Bona Fide Occupational Qualification—Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, inc. 1 —The Secretary of Labor2 brought suit
against Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Greyhound), the nation's largest
intercity bus carrier, 3 alleging that Greyhound's policy of refusing to
accept applications for the position of intercity bus driver from
persons thirty-five years of age and older 4 violated the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA or Act). 5 Specifically, the
91 288 F. Supp. at 821.
93
 109 N. J. Super. at 570, 264 A.2d at 106.
94
 The Offen Company had been operating since 1928 and had produced hundreds of
products which were located on several continents. Brief for Appellant, supra note 62 at 5. In
Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co., 239 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1965), the court found that
even when the successor knew that the predecessor had put a negligently designed device into
the channels of commerce it was under no duty to warn third parties. Id. at 250.
I 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, — S. Ct. — (1975).
2
 The Secretary of Labor has the authority to enforce compliance with the ADEA. 29
U.S.C. § 216 (Supp. 1975); 29 U.S.C. § 626 (Stipp. 1974).
Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 230, 232 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
499 F.2d at 860. Although Greyhound refuses to accept applications for the position of
intercity bus driver from persons over 35, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA) applies only to individuals between the ages of 40 and 65. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp.
1974). Thus, plaintiffs between 35 and 40 presumably would still be subject to discrimination
on the basis of age even if Greyhound's request for a BFOQ was denied.
5 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 at seq. (Supp. 1974). For a discussion of the Act in general, see
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Secretary charged Greyhound with violating section 4(a)(1), 6 by
refusing to hire an individual because of his age, and section
4(a)(2), 7 by limiting or classifying its employees in such a way as to
deny an individual an employment opportunity because of his age. 8
Greyhound contended that its maximum age hiring policy consti-
tuted a valid exception under section 4(f)(1) of the Act which pro-
vides: "It shall not be unlawful for an employer, (1) to take any
action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a), (b), . . . or (e) of
this section where age is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular busi-
ness. 
. "9
Greyhound maintained. that its maximum age hiring policy was
based on public safety considerations and thus constituted a bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) outside the prohibitions of
the Act." It argued that as a common carrier it was required by law
to exercise the highest degree of care in the hiring of its bus driv-
ers;" that a physical examination is incapable of revealing those
physical and sensory changes which are caused by age and which
make an interstate bus driver less safe in the normal operation of
defendant's business; 12
 that the irregular work schedule of a begin-
ning bus driver on the "extra board" 13 requires the highest degree of
Agatstein, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: A Critique, 19 N.Y.L.F. 309
(1973); Bergman, Age Discrimination in Employment & Air Carriers, 36 J. Air L. & Corn. 3
(1970); Halgren, Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 43 L.A. Bar Ass'n Bull, 361
(1968); Kovarsky & Kovarsky, Economic, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Age Discrimina-
tion Laws in Employment, 27 Vand. L. Rev. 839 (1974); Note, Age Discrimination in
Employment: The Problem of the Older Worker, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 383 (1966); Note, 24
Baylor L. Rev. 601 (1972).
6 This subsection of the statute provides; "(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer—(1) to
fail or refuse to - hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (Supp. 1974).
7 This subsection of the statute provides: "(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer—. , .
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's age; . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (Supp. 1974).
11 Greyhound was also charged with violating § 4(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (Supp.
1974), because its advertisements allegedly differentiate on the basis of age. 499 F.2d at 860;
354 F. Supp, at 230. Neither the district court nor the Seventh Circuit discussed this issue,
although the district court included violations of § 4(e) within the scope of its permanent
injunction. 354 F. Supp. at 239.
9 29 U.S.C. § 623(1)(1) (Supp. 1974).
1 ° 499 F.2d at 861.
11 354 F. Supp. at 232-33.
12
 Id. at 233-35.
13 Within Greyhound's organization there are two general classifications of drivers;
those who perform "regular runs" and those who perform "extra board." A regular
run is one which is performed regularly and is a scheduled service between two
points. On the other hand, "extra board" runs vary and are performed on the basis
of passenger demand and consist of special operations, towns, charters, and extra
sections of regular runs if there is a call for more than one bus on a regular run.
Extra board drivers do not have scheduled routes and work off of the board on a
689
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
physical ability;" and that newly-employed drivers between age 40
and 65 could not acquire the experience that usually accompanies a
good safety record." However, the federal district court rejected
Greyhound's underlying assumption that functional capacity is
equivalent to chronological age, and concluded that the evidence
presented by Greyhound did not meet the burden of "demonstrating
that its policy of age limitation is reasonably necessary to the normal
and safe operation of its business nor that age is a bona fide
occupational qualification within the meaning of the Act." 16
On appeal, Greyhound contended that the district court had
imposed an improper burden of proof, and that as a matter of law
the evidence demonstrated that Greyhound's hiring policy consti-
tuted a BFOQ reasonably necessary to the normal operation of its
business." In reversing the decision of the trial court, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit HELD: a bus
company need only demonstrate a rational basis in fact that elimina-
tion of its maximum age hiring policy will increase the likelihood of
risk to its passengers to establish that age constitutes a bona fide
occupational qualification under the ADEA. 18 The court stated that
more objective proof of the increase of risk of harm, as required by
the district court, "would effectively require Greyhound to go so far
as to experiment with the lives of passengers in order to provide
statistical evidence pertaining to the capabilities of newly hired
applicants forty to sixty-five years of age."" The court of appeals
disregarded the facts relied upon by the trial court and the infer-
ences formulated at the trial level and instead found Greyhound's
hiring policy to be justified and grounded on an adequate factual
basis. 2°
Following a brief discussion of the legislative history of the
ADEA, with particular reference to the bona fide occupational
qualification exception, this note will present an examination of the
Greyhound decision. Additional guidelines for interpretation of the
BFOQ exception, including federal regulations and similar case law
arising under Title VII, will also be considered to provide a
background for analysis of the case. In light of the available prece-
dent, the standard of proof utilized by the district court will be
first in, first out basis. . . . Extra board work and regular runs are assigned on the
basis of seniority.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 235-36.
15
 Id. at 236-37. Greyhound had presented evidence to show that an interstate bus driver
is most safe after acquiring 16 years of interstate bus driving experience. Id.
Id. at 239.
17
 499 F.2d at 861.
I° Id. at 863.
" Id. at 865. The trial judge had been critical of the evidence Greyhound presented
concerning physical examinations and their underlying assumptions, the rigors of "extra
board" work, and safety records by age group. 354 F. Supp. at 235-37.
2° 499 F.2d at 865.
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contrasted with the less stringent standard applied by the Seventh
Circuit on appeal. Finally, the findings of fact of the district court
will be examined to determine whether the appellate court was
justified in impliedly rejecting those findings. It will be submitted
that the Seventh Circuit's decision in Greyhound frustrates congres-
sional intent, as expressed in the enactment of the ADEA, by
permitting arbitrary and unreasonable age discrimination through
an overly broad application of the BFOQ exception.
In recognition of increasing unemployment among older work-
ers, Congress enacted the ADEA to promote the employment of
older workers based on their ability. 2 ' The Act is directed against
arbitrary discrimination "made in the absence of any legitimate
relevance between age and employment capacity." 22 Under the Act,
an employer is prohibited from refusing to hire, discharging, or
otherwise discriminating against a person with respect to compensa-
tion or conditions of employment on the basis of age. 23 In addition
an employer may not limit or classify his employees so as to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or adversely affect his
position because of his age. 24
The broad prohibitory provisions of the Act are qualified by
specific exemptions which allow otherwise unlawful practices under
certain conditions. Employers may discriminate where the differen-
tiation is based on reasonable factors other than age. 25 For example,
differentiations may be based on physical examinations where the
job demands stringent physical requirements due to inherent occu-
pational factors, and such requirements are reasonably related to the
work to be performed. 26 The ADEA also allows discrimination if
age is shown to be a "bona fide occupational qualification reason-
21 H.R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News, 2213, 2214,
22
 Hearings on S. 830 & S. 788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on
Labor & Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 37 (1967) (statement of W. Wirtz, Secretary
of Labor).
" 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (Supp. 1974).
24 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (Supp. 1974),
25 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (Supp. 1974).
26 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(0(ii) (1972) (sandhogs, iron workers, bridge builders). The regula-
tions concerning this particular exemptam make it clear that differentiations based on blanket
assumptions that all individuals over a certain age are incapable of performing certain jobs
will not be accepted. 29 C.F.R. § 806,103(1)(iii) (1972). In reply to an inquiry whether a
company could continue to make use of help wanted advertisements containing age limita-
tions if the work involved heavy manual labor, the wage and hour administrator replied:
We do not think it would be correct to conclude that every individual above a
chosen age limit is physically unable to perform the vigorous work you describe. The
fact that many, or even most, such individfials may be so disqualified does not make
a case for application of this exemption, for it is the arbitrary and unreasonable age
discrimination against the others, who are physically qualified notwithstanding their
age, which is the essence of the wrong prohibited by this act.
Administrative Opinion Letter from Clarence J. Lundquist, Wage and Hour Administrator,
July 26, 1968, reprinted in 8 BNA Lab. Rel. Rep. 1111 401:5205, 5206,
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ably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business." 27
Greyhound relied upon this latter provision to justify its hiring
policy. 28
Throughout the Act and its accompanying regulations, 29 it is
stressed that blanket assertions or conclusionary statements that all
members of a particular age group are incapable of certain physical
functions will not form a basis for a valid exemption to the ADEA.
While experience may have shown that the majority of individuals
above a certain age no longer possess certain qualifications for a job,
some individuals may still retain these capabilities. Thus discrimina-
tion based on age is forbidden. 3° Attempts at exemption from the
Act, such as the declaration of a BFOQ, must be judged individu-
ally on a case by case basis, in the context of the pertinent facts
surrounding each particular situation. 3 '
The legislative history of the ADEA offers little guidance to the
courts in interpreting the BFOQ exemption. 32
 Consequently, the
courts have turned to various other interpretative aids, including: ( 1)
the similarity between the BFOQ exemption under the ADEA 33 and
that under Title VII; 34
 (2) case law involving age, sex, and racial
discrimination; and (3) federal regulations issued in conjunction with
the ADEA.
The origins of the ADEA intertwine with the enactment of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimi-
nation based on sex, race, or national origin. 35 That statute au-
thorized the Secretary of Labor to undertake a study which resulted
in specific legislative action designed to eliminate arbitrary age
discrimination, the ADEA. 36 If the word "age" were to be substi-
tuted for "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," the BFOQ
provision of the ADEA would be identical to that of Title VII
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 37 Unfortunately, there is a
similar lack of legislative history concerning the BFOQ under Title
22 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (Supp. 1974). See text at note 9 supra.
28 499 F.2d at 861. In addition to the two exceptions discussed in the text, employers
may differentiate on the basis of age to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or
pension plan, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. 1974), or to discharge or discipline an employee for
good cause. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (Supp. 1974).
29 The Secretary of Labor is given the authority to promulgate interpretative regulations
in connection with the ADEA. 29 U.S.C, § 628 (Supp. 1975). See 29 C.F.R. §§ 850.1-860.120
(1972).
38
 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(g) (1972).
31 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1972).
32 H.R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2213.
33 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (Supp, 1974).
34
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1970).
35
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970).
16 H.R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2213, 2214.
37 Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1972).
Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (Supp. 1974) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1970).
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VII. The Title VII BFOQ exemption was added on the last day of
debate with no committee hearings. 38 However, the similarity of
language between the BFOQ provisions of these two acts has fos-
tered judicial application of Title VII case law as precedent in age
discrimination cases. 39
Early cases construing the exemption under Title VII inter-
preted the phrases "bona fide" and "reasonably necessary" to mean
good faith on the part of the employer." This interpretation of the
exemption demanded only that the employer demonstrate that his
exclusive hiring policy was not based on an intent to discriminate. 41
This subjective test was modified, however, by the Fifth Circuit in
Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 42 which re-
quired that generalizations concerning the capabilities of the respec-
tive sexes be based on fact. 43 It is this latter standard which is the
subject of controversy in the Greyhound case."
Greyhound is the second case in which the BFOQ exemption
under the ADEA has been interpreted. The only prior case,
Hodgson v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 45 presented an almost identical
fact situation involving an affiliate of the independent intercity bus
companies operating as "Trailways." 46 In that case, a federal dis-
trict court in Florida held that the maximum age hiring policy of the
employer bus company did constitute a BFOQ necessary for
efficient business operations and in furtherance of the public in-
terest. 47 While the court in Tamiami found that the substantive test
of Weeks required the defendant to have an objective factual basis
for its belief, it also decided that it was impractical to require an
employer to consider individually the qualifications of each appli-
cant." The court accepted chronological age as the most effective
tool for screening out bus driver applicants likely to be unsatisfac-
tory. 49
38 See Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 431, 441-42
(1966); Note, 8 Wake Forest L. Rev. 124, 125 (1971).
39 Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 820-22 (5th Cir. 1972),
4° Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332, 361 (S.D. Ind. 1967), modified,
416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Ward v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 260 F. Supp. 579, 581
(W.D. Tenn. 1966). For a further discussion of the BFOQ under Title VII, see Comment,
1973-1974 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 15 B.C, Ind. & Com, L, Rev. 1105, 1205,
1218-31 (1974); Note, 25 Ark. L. Rev. 333 (1971); Note, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 747
(1971); Note, 3 Texas Tech. L. Rev. 197 (1971); Note, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 395; Note, 8 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 124 (1971); Note, 17 Wayne L. Rev. 242 (1971).
41 Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332, 361 (S.D. Ind. 1967), modified,
416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Ward v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 260 F. Supp. 579, 581
(W.D. Tenn. 1966).
42 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
43 Id. at 235.
44 499 F.2d at 861-62.
43 4 EPD 1) 7795, at 6047 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
4° Id. at 6049 n.1,
47 Id. at 6052.
49 Id. at 6050.
49 Id. at 6052, Although neither the lower court nor the appellate court in Greyhound
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The primary sources of information and guidance on the BFOQ
under the ADEA are the federal regulations issued by the Depart-
ment of Labor in conjunction with the Act. 5 ° Within these inter-
pretative aids, the Secretary of Labor has given a consistently nar-
row interpretation to the bona fide occupational qualification sec-
tion. 5 ' When faced with a problem of statutory construction, great
deference is shown the interpretation of a statute expressed in the
regulations of the agency charged with its administration. 52 Two
examples of a BFOQ are described in the regulations: (1) jobs
wherein an actor or model must be of a particular age or appear-
ance;" and (2) jobs for which qualifications are imposed by federal
statutes and regulations to promote the safety and convenience of
the public. 54 Included under the latter category are airline pilots
forbidden from engaging in carrier operations after age sixty by
regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration." The govern-
ment apparently felt that the extent of the safety risk posed by
elderly pilots justified the imposition of a mandatory retirement age
without reference to the individual's actual physical condition at the
terminal age. No federal regulations are currently in effect requiring
a compulsory retirement age for intercity bus drivers or a maximum
age hiring policy for either bus drivers or airline pilots. The hiring
age involved in the instant controversy was fixed by Greyhound and
not by a public agency, such as the FAA, and thus does not fall
within the scope of the Labor Department regulations, which speak
only in terms of "federal statutory and regulatory requirements." 56
As the Department of Transportation has promulgated extensive
regulations governing the physical conditions of intercity bus driv-
ers, 57 it would seem that the Department also would have instituted
a maximum age hiring policy if it were considered necessary to
protect the public.
As a consequence of the scarcity both of legislative history of
the ADEA and relevant age discrimination case law, the analysis of
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Greyhound must be based upon
interpretations of the ADEA by the agency charged with its en-
cited Tamiami, the attention of both Greyhound courts was directed to the decision and much
of the appellate court's reasoning parallels that of the district court in Tamiami. See Brief for
Plaintiff at 49, Hodgson v, Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974). For a
general illustration of parallels in the two cases compare 499 F.2d at 861-65 with 4 EPD
¶ 7795, at 6048-52.
50
 29 C.F.R. §§ 850.1-860.120 (1972).
51
 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1972).
52
 Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
53
 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(e) (1972).
54
 49 C.F.R. § 860.102(d) (1972).
55
 See id. For a fuller discussion of the legality of a mandatory retirement age for
pilots and the unsettled controversy concerning those individual companies who maintain
maximum age hiring policies, see Bergman supra note 5, at 11-27.
56
 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(d) (1972).
57
 49 C.F.R. § 391.1-.67 (1974). See note 104 infra for a discussion of regulations of
the Dept. of Transportation concerning intercity bus drivers.
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forcement and upon analogous statutes and case law. The key issue
raised on appeal was the employer's burden of proof under the
ADEA. Greyhound contended that the trial court imposed an im-
proper burden of proof on it. 58 Since proof of Greyhound's
maximum age hiring policy had established a prima fade case of age
discrimination under federal regulations, 59 the burden of justifica-
tion was on Greyhound, the employer, to establish a bona fide
occupational qualification." Greyhound maintained, however, that
the standard of proof required by the district court to establish the
existence of the BFOQ was incorrect. 6 '
In light of the similarity of sex and age discrimination cases,
which involve comparable bona fide occupational qualification pro-
visions, 62 the Greyhound district court utilized the standard of proof
of a BFOQ formulated in a sex discrimination case, Weeks v.
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. 63 Weeks involved dis-
criminatory practices by a telephone company, which refused to
consider women for the position of telephone switchman. As an
affirmative defense, Southern Bell argued that its sex-based restric-
tion was a bona fide occupational qualification because women as a
class were unable to cope with the allegedly strenuous activity of
lifting weights in excess of thirty pounds." The Weeks court denied
the telephone company a BFOQ exemption, holding that the com-
pany failed to prove that it "had reasonable cause to believe, that
is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women
would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the
job involved."65 The Fifth Circuit viewed the use of an employment
classification based upon a stereotyped characterization of women as
a group, with no factual evidence to sustain that classification, as
constituting arbitrary and unjust discrimination. 66
The Seventh Circuit in Greyhound, however, found the stan-
dard of proof enunciated in Weeks inappropriate since that case did
not involve "a situation where the lives of numerous persons are
completely dependent on the capabilities of the job applicant." 67
Instead the court found what it believed to be a more appropriate
standard in a sex discrimination case involving the airline industry,
since the primary function of that industry is also the safe transpor-
tation of passengers. 68 In that case, Diaz v. Pan American World
58 499 F.2d at 860.
59 Id.
" 29 C.F.R.	 860.102(b) (1972).
61 499 F.2d at 860.
62 See text at notes 35-39 supra.
63 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
64 Southern Bell had placed great weight on state protective legislation which prohibited
women and minors from lifting weights over 30 pounds. Id. at 232.
65 Id. at 235.
66 Id. at 234-35.
62
 499 F.2d at 861-62.
' Id. at 862.
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Airways, InC., 69 a male applied for a job as flight cabin attendant
with Pan American Airlines. He was rejected because Pan Am's
hiring policy restricted consideration of applicants for that position
to females. In its analysis of the standard of proof required to
establish a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of that particular business or enter-
prise," 7° the court in Diaz construed the word "necessary" to require
"that we apply a business necessity test, not a business convenience
test. That is to say, discrimination based on sex is valid only when
the essence of the business operation would be undermined by not
hiring members of one sex exclusively.'"' The Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that the non-mechanical aspects of' the job of flight cabin
attendant, 72 which male applicants were deemed incapable of per-
forming, were not reasonably necessary to the normal operation or
essence of Pan Am's business." Thus, the granting of a BFOQ
exemption was not warranted.
In its rejection of Weeks in favor of the Diaz standard, the
appellate court in Greyhound seemed to imply that the formulae
established in these two cases were mutually exclusive. 74 In reality,
however, the standard of proof applied in Weeks is not inconsistent
with that formulated in Diaz. The Fifth Circuit in Diaz distin-
guished its earlier decision in Weeks by establishing: (1) that all or
substantially all men had not been shown to be inadequate for the
position of flight cabin attendant; and (2) the nonmechanical duties
of the disputed position in Diaz were not necessary to the normal
operation of business." These two cases, when read together, re-
quire that if there exists a factual basis to justify a discriminatory
pre-employment qualification, that qualification must still be func-
tionally related to the essence of the business involved to be a valid
BFOQ. It is submitted that such a two pronged test should have
been applied in Greyhound. Under such a test, Greyhound would be
required to prove that the qualifications of its bus drivers are related
to the essence of its business, the safe transportation of passengers,
as well •
 as the premise that all or substantially all applicants over
forty posed a significant safety risk.
It initially appears that the Seventh Circuit in Greyhound
abandoned Weeks for the standard of proof articulated in Diaz.
However, the court did not rely on Diaz, but merely used its
interpretation of that case as a justification for abandoning the test
" 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
7°
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(eX1) (1974).
71
 442 F.2d at 388.
72 The non-mechanical aspects of a flight attendant's job included attending to the
special psychological needs of the passengers. Id. at 387.
" Id. at 388-89.
74 See 499 F.2d at 861-62.
75
 442 F.2d at 388.
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specified in Weeks. 76 For a statement of the proper standard of
proof, the Greyhound court relied upon a second airline industry
case, Spurlock v. United Airlines, inc." Spurlock involved a chal-
lenge to the pre-employment pilot qualifications established by Un-
ited Airlines, which required 500 hours of flight time and a college
degree. This requirement had a disparate impact in that it fell more
heavily on black applicants than white and thus led to a charge of
racial discrimination. The Tenth Circuit held that in those jobs
involving a high degree of skill and a great potential for economic
and human risk due to the hiring of an unqualified applicant, "the
employer bears a correspondingly lighter burden to show that his
employment criteria are job-related." 78 Thus, since United's flight
officers pilot aircraft worth $20 million and carry 300 passengers per
flight, United Airlines could meet the lighter burden of proving that
its employment requirements were job related. Thus, in its extended
reliance on the lighter burden language of Spurlock, 79 the Seventh
Circuit in Greyhound applied a standard of proof so deferential to
the defendant as to broaden the exemption in a manner that renders
the prohibitions of the ADEA almost meaningless. The Seventh
Circuit merely required Greyhound to demonstrate that it has a
rational basis in fact to believe that elimination of its maximum
hiring age would result in a minimal -
 increase in risk of harm by
jeopardizing the life of one more person than might otherwise oc-
CUr. 80
Despite the similarity of the safe transportation factor involved
in both Spurlock and Greyhound, crucial distinctions may be drawn
between these two cases. Greyhound is a BFOQ case dealing with
an asserted exception to the charge of ay discrimination. It clearly
belongs in the realm of Diaz and. especially Weeks, similar BFOQ
cases dealing with comparable legislative language in the area of
sex discrimination. The Spurlock situation would appear to bear a
greater resemblance to that exemption in the ADEA which allows
differentiation based on reasonable factors other than age," rather
than the BFOQ exemption. The requirements established by United
in Spurlock were found statistically to have a reasonable relation-
ship to the position in question. 82
 Furthermore, the burden of jus-
tification arguably should differ with the magnitude of the risk
involved. This decrease in the required standard of proof in rela-
tionship to the amount of risk involved would seem to be substan-
tiated by the absence of federal regulations governing the retirement
76
 499 F.2d at 861-62.
77
 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1973).
7"
 Id. at 219.
79
 499 F.2d at 863.
66
 Id. at 863.
61
 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (Supp. 1974). See text at notes 25-26 supra.
212
 475 F.2d at 218-19.
697
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
age of bus drivers while regulating that of pilots. There is a differ-
ence in the potential risk posed by an airline pilot lacking in essen-
tial flight skills and an otherwise qualified person beyond a certain
age driving an intercity bus. The results of a miscalculation are far
more disastrous in the former instance than in the latter. Thus,
while the burden of proof perhaps should be lowered for the
employer of airline pilots in consideration of the magnitude of the
risk, more stringent standards should be required for the employer
of intercity bus drivers.
The Seventh Circuit based its reliance on Spurlock solely on the
common feature of the industries involved, the safe transportation of
passengers." However, the trial judge in Greyhound stressed that in
deciding whether all or substantially all bus driver applicants over
the age of forty would constitute a risk to the public, "[s]afety is the
foremost concern involved herein not only for defendant but for
plaintiff and this Court as well . . ."84 Thus, the district court had
already lowered the Diaz-Weeks burden of proof in terms of the
higher duty of care owed by a common carrier." It appears that the
Seventh Circuit in Greyhound actually applied the district court's
standard of proof. The appellate court's determination that
"Greyhound must demonstrate it has a rational basis in fact to
believe that elimination of its maximum hiring age will increase the
likelihood of risk of harm to its passengers"86 would appear to
delineate substantially the same standard as the district court's
requirement that Greyhound must have " 'reasonable cause to be-
lieve, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially
all [applicants over 40] . . . would be unable to perform safely and
efficiently the duties of the job involved.' "87
As it is submitted that the appellate court utilized the same
standard of proof as the district court in Greyhound, it is further
submitted that the appellate court erred in disregarding the facts as
found by the district court. Under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the appellate court does not review the evidence as
an original fact finding tribunal; 88 it does not attempt to settle
conflicts in evidence or to determine 'questions of credibility. 89 The
district court found that Greyhound failed to establish the minimal
rational relationship between its discriminatory pre-employment
2 ' 499 F.2d at 862-63.
29 354 F. Supp. at 239.
a' While the district court in Greyhound does not refer specifically to the Diaz case, the
opinion speaks in terms of the "essence" of a business. Id. at 231-32.
86 499 F.2d at 863.
" .354 F. Supp. at 236, quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 408 F.2d 228, 235
(1969).
" 'Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P.
52.
29 Id.
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criteria and its proffered goal of safety. 9 ° The facts as found by the
district court should have been accepted unless clearly erroneous.
While it was recognized by both the district and appellate
courts that safety was of primary concern, 91 the district court held
that Greyhound did not prove the conclusionary determination that
all applicants over forty would be incapable of performing as an
intercity bus driver. 92 Greyhound originally established its
maximum age hiring policy at the time of its incorporation in 1929,,
without benefit of surveys, inquiries, or research or statistical
studies. 93 The same age limitations have remained in effect despite
recent advances in medical diagnosis and improvement in the
technology of buses." The district court found that without a
further factual basis, such a good faith classification violated the
intent of the ADEA to promote individualized determination of
fitness, and thus did not satisfy the factual basis required by the
Weeks decision. 95
Contrary to the "findings" of the appellate court, the district
court found that Greyhound could meet its public safety respon-
sibilities as a common carrier through less arbitrary measures than
an absolute exclusion of every applicant over age forty." The ar-
gument presented to the appellate court by Greyhound 97 resembles a
statement in Tamiami that " 'where an employer sustains its burden
in demonstrating that it is impossible or highly impractical to deal
with . . . [applicants] on an individualized basis, it may apply a
reasonable general rule.' "" The argument bears no weight in
Greyhound, however, for the district court found that the screening
processes already employed by Greyhound provided ample oppor-
tunity to exclude unsuitable individuals. 99
The inability of physical examinations to detect the functional
age of an applicant was cited by Greyhound as the primary justifica-
9° 354 F. Supp. 239.
91 499 F.2d at 863; 354 F. Supp. at 239.
92 354 F. Supp. at 236. The basis of Greyhound's argument was that imperceptible
physical and sensory changes caused by aging and the detrimental effects these changes have
on driving skills preclude the acceptance of job applicants over age forty. 499 F.2d at 863.
However, due to conflicting evidence from witnesses on both sides of the case, the district
court found there was no agreement as to the reliability or the proper weight to be accorded
physical examinations as a means of discovering these changes. 354 F. Supp. at 235. The
primary purpose of the health examination given by Greyhound was recognized as the
detection of gross physical and mental defects that would affect an applicant's ability to drive
a bus. Id. at 232.
93 354 F. Supp. at 238.
94 Id. The district court took into consideration the introduction of diesel powered buses
which are easier to manipulate, improved roads, and more extensive training practices. Id.
95 Id.
98' Id. at 239.
97 499 F.2d at 864.
98 4 EPD ¶ 7795, at 6050, quoting Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235 n.5.
99 354 F. Supp. at 239.
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tion for the arbitrary age limit of age forty."° Dispute is evidenced,
however, by contradictory testimony from expert witnesses as to the
extent to which chronological age is a reliable index of physical or
psychological decline.m Greyhound also maintained that even if it
were able to adequately screen out "degenerative disabilities oc-
casioned by age in the forty to sixty-five age bracket, it is question-
able whether Greyhound could practicably scrutinize the continued
* fitness of such drivers on a frequent and regular basis."'" This
impracticality aspect of Greyhound's argument was rejected by the
district court.'" Physical examinations form only a portion of
Greyhound's total testing procedures capable of detecting changes
brought about by the aging process.'" The district court found that
these screening procedures utilized by Greyhound demonstrated the
exercise of a high degree of care by the defendant.'"
The testing procedures currently utilized by Greyhound are
apparently competent to determine the functional ability of those
drivers over forty already employed by the company. Greyhound
has never instituted a policy recommending that all drivers over
forty should retire.'° 6 Thus, it appears that the procedures currently
in effect for testing applicants and employees are so extensive that
only individuals of the highest physical condition are initially ac-
cepted. From the pool of applicants below age forty, only 5 percent
meet the rigid requirements in effect, despite their age.'" The
district court held that these procedures were particularly suited to
the achievement of safety through the individual determination of
functional age. 188 The procedures utilized for employees would
'°° Id. at 233.
10 ' Similar problems concerning the relationship of chronological and functional age
have arisen in other industries. The research center for the FAA found:
[A]t the present time no medical methods exist for evaluating an adult human being
in terms that will provide a useful estimate of his overall status as an aging animal
. .. chronological age fails to serve as an accurate index of the rate at which these
capabilities change in every individual. Men who are in their fifth and sixth decades
function, whereas young men may be old for their age.
FAA Office of Aviation Medicine, Studies on Aging in Aviation Personnel 64-1 (Aug. 1964).
Cited in Bergman at 21, see note S supra.
102
 499 F.2d at 864.
'°3
 354 F. Supp. at 239.
I"
 In addition to the physical examination required by federal regulations at two-year
intervals until age fifty and annually thereafter to age 65, 354 F. Supp. at 233, Greyhound
utilizes continuous monitoring procedures to detect personality changes, changes in reaction
time, and difficulty in dealing with adverse weather and special visibility conditions. Id.
Minimum standards set by the Department of Transportation also require a low-accident rate,
safe driving habits and a detailed background investigation of the individual concerning
driving record, financial responsibility, criminal record and past employment history. 49
C.F.R. §§ 391.21, 391.23, 391.25, 391.27 (1973).
' 03 354 F. Supp. at 233.
1 ° 6 Id.
1 ° 2
 Brief for Plaintiff at 25-26, Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th
Cir. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Plaintiff].
too
	
F. Supp. at 239.
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merely have to be extended to the applicant level to replace the
present arbitrary discrimination based on age.
Since it retains drivers who have reached their fortieth birth-
day,'° 9 it is apparent that Greyhound does not question a person's
ability to drive a bus when he is over forty years of age. Greyhound
does maintain, however, that older drivers may compensate for this
aging process and the alleged accompanying physical decline by
obtaining regular runs."° Greyhound's seniority system demands
that beginning drivers serve from 10 to 20 years on the extra board,
making charter and non-regular runs on the basis of passenger
demand."' Thus, a beginning driver over age forty could not com-
pensate for the alleged age-related decline in his driving ability
because he is working the extra board. 12 The district court did not
find this distinction drawn by Greyhound between the extra board
and regular runs viable. The district court found that irregular
hours and possible adverse driving conditions would have no greater
effect on those applicants over forty than on those under forty. 13
Finally, the district court rejected as determinative
Greyhound's statistical studies which reflected, among other things,
that Greyhound's safest driver is one who has had 16 to 20 years of.
driving experience with Greyhound and is between 50 to 55 years of
age. 14 This optimum blend of age and experience could never be
's" Id. at 233.
11 " 499 F.2d at 864. See note 13 supra.
HI 354 F. Supp, at 231', 235. The seniority system prescribing that new drivers go to the
bottom of the extra board is specified in Greyhound's union contract, a result of collective
bargaining. Id. No question was raised as to the validity of this system under the ADEA.
While on the extra board, a driver is on call 24 hours a day, seven days a week performing
charter and other unscheduled trips outside the territory served by Greyhound's regular runs.
499 F.2d at 864. However, Greyhound's union contract guarantees an off period of twenty-
four consecutive hours in a calendar week. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 107, at 12.
Additionally, federal regulations forbid a driver to drive more than ten hours or be on duty for
more than fifteen hours (including driving time) in a twenty-four hour period without at least
eight consecutive hours off. 49 C.F.R. 395.3(a) (1973). Finally, the monthly mileage of a
regular driver is generally twice that of a driver on the extra board. 354 F. Supp. at 237.
I12 354 F. Supp. at 235.
'' Id, at 235-36. Every applicant would seem to have the right to an undesirable job. In
a similar situation involving sex discrimination, the court held that a woman was entitled to
apply for an unromantic job involving long hours and poor working conditions if she so
desired. Cheatwood v. Southern Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754, 758 (N. D.
Alas. 1969).
The district court found Greyhound's employment of older extra board drivers on certain
occasions inconsistent with the safety considerations it presented at trial. 354 F. Supp. at
237-38. It is an annual practice to employ schoolteachers until age fifty for work on the extra
board during peak summer months. Id. at 238. Greyhound regularly leases equipment and
drivers from other companies to cover runs outside Greyhound's authorized territory, regard-
less of the age at which these drivers were employed. Id. at 237-38. Finally, Greyhound's own
older drivers who wish to do so may continue to bid on and perform extra board work until
their retirement. Id. at 236. Other drivers remain on extra board runs despite twenty years of
experience because they have not yet accumulated sufficient seniority to take over a regular
position. Id,
14 354 F. Supp. at 236-37.
701
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
obtained by those applicants over forty years of age. However,
while Greyhound formulated this portrait of its optimum driver, it
has provided no statistical study of the acceptable or quite capable
driver.
The validity of other statistics furnished by Greyhound was
questioned by the district court. 15 Greyhound maintained, for
example, that the accident rate of a driver over age 55 begins to
increase slightly due to the fact that his age has begun to offset his
experience. 16 However, there was testimony that this slight up-
swing was not significantly different from chance. " 7 In addition,
the statistics introduced by Greyhound did not take into account the
number of miles logged by drivers in each group." 8 Thus, it is
impossible to compare accidents per mile driven in relation to the
driver's age. The district court found the question unanswered
whether a person over forty is less safe than one under forty as the
evidence was not sufficiently broken down to isolate age as a sig-
nificant variable." 9 Other factors pertinent to the causation of acci-
dents may have influenced these statistics other than age—working
conditions such as weather, time of day, traffic conditions, highway
design and hours driven before the accident.' 2 °
In actuality, Greyhound did not utilize those statistics which
would have been most helpful and enlightening. Greyhound did not
compare the accident rates of its extra board drivers over the age of
forty with those of its extra board drivers below the age of forty. 12 '
Nor did it compare the relationship between age and failure at the
applicant training stage. 122 Rather, Greyhound chose to compare
either the records of all drivers over forty with those under that age,
making no distinction between extra board and regular run drivers,
or extra board drivers with those on regular runs, regardless of age.
Thus, the district court found that the better safety record of drivers
over age forty could be held to apply to extra board as well as
regular run drivers. 1 23
It is submitted that the facts discussed above as found by the
district court were not so unsubstantiated as to be deemed clearly
erroneous. The fact that Greyhound had the ability to produce the
best statistical evidence and did not, might have supported the
inference that such evidence was withheld because it was detrimen-
tal to Greyhound's cause. 124 If the appellate court concluded that
the inferences accepted by the district court as findings of fact were
15 Id. at 237.
116 Id. at 236.
112 Id. at 237.
118 Id.
"9 Id.
128
 Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 107, at 28.
121 354 F. Supp. at 236.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Stocker v. Boston & Maine R.R., 84 N.H. 377, 151 Ad. 457 (19301.
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mistaken, the correct course would have been to remand for further
fact finding. The complete rejection of the findings of the trial court
in the present situation was unwarranted.
It appears that the appellate court in Grayhound erred in
overturning the district court's denial of a BFOQ exemption for the
maximum age hiring policy of Greyhound. Since the appellate court,
in effect, applied the standard of proof utilized by the district court,
it was not justified in disregarding the evidentiary findings of the
trial court. The appellate court found that Greyhound's good faith
judgment concerning the safety needs of its passengers constituted a
rational basis in fact to believe that all or substantially all applicants
over forty were incapable of performing the duties of an intercity
bus driver. 125 On the basis, of dicta in the Weeks opinion, 126
Greyhound asserted that it was relieved of the necessity of proving
that "all or substantially all" applicants were unfit due to the im-
practicality of the individual determination of the capabilities of
each applicant.' 27 This argument is not warranted by the facts,
however. The district court held that individual consideration was
indeed possible and that Greyhound's good faith judgment was not
a sufficient factual basis to support a discriminatory hiring policy.' 28
The appellate court's reliance on Greyhound's good intentions harks
back to the subjective test of the early Title VII cases which was
clearly rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Weeks' 29 and should not
receive renewed life in age discrimination cases.
It is submitted that the Seventh Circuit's acceptance of
Greyhound's conclusionary assumption that older applicants pose a
safety risk violates the essence of the ADEA. The Greyhound deci-
sion provides a precedent in the area of common carriers and other
industries responsible for the safety of the public allowing the decla-
ration of a bona fide occupational qualification under the ADEA by
a mere showing of a rational basis in fact and a minimal increase in
risk of harm to passengers. In contrast to the requirements of the
ADEA, Greyhound thus appears to require less than a showing that
discrimination on the basis of age is reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the business involved in order to establish a
bona fide occupational qualification.' As the leading decision on the
BFOQ under the ADEA, Greyhound has opened the door for the
exception to overwhelm the Act and frustrate attempts to remedy
arbitrary 'age discrimination.
SUSAN ELIZABETH CHAMPION
125 499 F.2d at 865.
129
 408 F.2d at 236 n.5.
122 499 F.2d at 864.
128 354 F. Supp. at 238-39.
129 For a discussion of the subjective "good faith" test, see text at n.40 supra.
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